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Resolving post-formation challenges in shared IJVs: The impact of shared IJV 
structure on inter-partner relationships 
  
1. Introduction 
Highly symbolic of the co-operative spirit, the shared management international joint 
venture (shared IJV) is a popular management control structure to govern IJVs 
(Buckley & Casson, 2002). Often known as the “50:50”, this structure requires IJV 
parents to hold an equal equity, equally share control and co-manage IJV operations 
(Killing, 1983). Yet research contends shared IJVs are inherently problematic and 
unstable (Owens and Quinn, 2007; Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006; Ding, 1997; Killing, 
1983). The conditions of effective shared control, participatory decision-making, 
integrative operations, extensive resource and task interdependencies are difficult to 
sustain due to cultural misunderstanding between partners, operational conflicts, 
competition for control, and other issues (Ding, 1997; Johnson, 1997; Hambrick, Li, 
Xin, & Tsai, 2001; Killing, 1983; Pearce, 2000; Owens and Quinn, 2007). Indeed, 
some authors have found that shared JVs often evolve into either majority control 
ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries as partners become frustrated by their 
challenges (e.g. Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006).     
At the same time, other authors consider potential performance-related 
benefits of shared IJV structures (e.g. Steensma & Lyles, 2000). They suggest that 
equal management input between partners may enhance learning and improve 
decision-making through mutual involvement and familiarity with IJV operations 
(Hill & Hellrigel, 1994; Saxton, 1997). Equal ownership and participation in decision-
making may also engender commitment and perceptions of justice (e.g. Child, 2000).  
Notwithstanding the valuable contribution of both perspectives, the research in 
both areas, with some exceptions (Barden, Steesma, & Lyles 2005; Salk, 1996; Salk 
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& Brannan, 2000), has been limited to examining the direct relationship between IJV 
structure and performance (e.g., Beamish, 1984; Ding, 1997; Killing, 1983; Mjoen & 
Tallman, 1997; Phatak & Chowdhury, 1991; Yan & Gray, 1994). Existing research 
primarily sought to compare the IJV performance outcomes of the shared structure 
compared with the dominant or unilateral structure (Killing, 1983; Fryxell, Dooley, & 
Vryza, 2002; Yan & Gray, 1994). Yet the lack of agreement on the significance of the 
shared IJV structure described above suggests that other factors may interfere to 
determine its performance outcomes (Child & Yan, 2003; Steemsa & Lyles 2000;). 
Importantly, the impact of IJV structure on post-formation challenges and JV 
performance may be more complex than a simple positive/negative effect. For 
instance, Barden et al. (2005, p. 157) find that “the entire debate may be overly 
constrained and simplistic” and propose that the impact of JV structure is mediated by 
other factors such as whether managers perceive the equity distribution as just. This 
suggests that we need to supplement the performance studies with more in-depth 
investigations of how IJV structures are associated with various post-formation 
conditions and processes that may in turn impact managers’ ability to address post-
formation challenges.  
There are a number of studies on how IJV partners may manage post-
formation challenges, and many authors have suggested strategies such as adjustment 
and compromise, personnel exchanges, training and intensified communication 
(Arino & De Le Torre, 1998; Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006; Buchel, 2000, 2002; Das 
and Teng, 1998; Doz, 1996; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Kim & Parkhe, 2009; Kumar & 
Nti, 1998; Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002). However, these studies have not specifically 
examined the interplay between IJV structure and post-formation IJV conditions. In 
the meanwhile, several IJV scholars put forward conceptual arguments that IJV 
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structure shapes post-formation management processes, including formal controls and 
partner relations (Contractor, 2005; Contractor & Reuer, 2014; Hennart & Zeng, 
2005). The IJV’s structure has been recognized as the organizational architecture that 
generates certain formal and informal control conditions that may provide the means 
to resolve post-formation problems (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Fryxell, Dooley, & Vryza 
2002; Yan & Gray, 1994). However, none of the studies examine in detail how 
particular IJV structures generate specific control conditions and how, in turn, these 
conditions may help resolve specific post-formation challenges.  
In this paper, we start to address these research gaps in the context of shared 
or 50:50 IJV structure that is widely regarded as problematic in the IJV literature. We 
aim to explore how the shared IJV structure makes possible certain relational 
conditions such as trust, commitment and communication. We also examine how 
these relational conditions, in turn, allow managers to cope with particular post-
formation challenges. We focus on relational conditions as past IJV management and 
process studies have firmly established that positive relationships or “relational 
capital” has a major bearing on how IJVs proceed and perform (Brouthers and 
Bamossy, 2006; Cullen, Johnson & Sakano, 2000; Das and Teng, 1998; Doz, 1996; 
Kale & Singh, 2009; Liu, Ghauri, & Sinkovics, 2010; Muthusamy & White, 2006).  
To accomplish this, we draw upon four case studies of shared IJVs between 
British multinationals and Asian partners. The institutional and organizational 
differences between European and Asian partners will often lead to challenges in IJV 
relationships – e.g. conflicts resulting from cultural differences (Mohr & Puck, 2005; 
Swierczek, 1994) – which provide a fertile context to investigate how shared IJVs 
cope with post-formation challenges.  
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The analysis of our case studies revealed that such features of the 50/50 
structure as equal equity and equal division of management responsibilities in the IJV 
encourage partners to build trust, respect and commitment in their relationship and 
also to use more participatory and consensus-building strategies to address inter-
organizational differences. These positive relational developments effectively provide 
opportunities and sometimes forceful motivation for the partners to resolve the 
challenges they experience in the post-formation stage.  
Our findings contribute to the shared IJV literature through a more detailed 
and nuanced picture of the 50/50 structure post-formation (Child and Faulkner, 1998; 
Killing, 1983; Pearce, 2000). We respond to the call to create a more complex 
understanding of the post-formation effects of IJV control structures (Barden et al. 
2005; Child & Yan, 2003; Steemsa and Lyles, 2000), and ours is the first empirical 
investigation to examine the three-way relationship between the shared structure, 
relational conditions and the possibility of addressing post-formation challenges. Our 
finding that the shared structure can create organizational conditions that promote 
inter-partner trust and commitment challenges the argument that 50/50 structures are 
inherently detrimental to IJV performance (e.g. Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006; Ding, 
1997; Killing, 1983). We further provide support for prior tentative conceptualisations 
of shared structures as having positive effects on cooperation in IJVs (Child, 2000; 
Hebert, 1996; Steensma & Lyles, 2000) and yet we detail the organizational and 
relational outcomes of shared structures. We connect specific features of the shared 
structure, such as high operational interdependence and shared decision-making, to 
specific outcomes such as trust, commitment and diplomacy. These conditions help 
managers steer the IJV through conflicts and external crisis situations. In this way, we 
contribute empirical evidence to mostly conceptual studies on how the initial 
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structural decisions of IJV shape post-formation IJV behaviour and outcomes 
(Contractor, 2005; Contractor & Reur, 2014). On the practical level, our findings will 
assist practicing IJV managers in better understanding the ramifications of the initial 
decision of a shared IJV structure for post-formation IJV management.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We first explain the 
conceptual understandings that underlie our research. We present our 
conceptualization of the shared IJV’s management structure, and then explain how the 
IJV relational conditions or the nature of the relationship between the IJV partners 
may impact the ability of the partners to manage IJV challenges. We then outline our 
theoretical understanding of how the shared structure may create particular relational 
conditions that then impact the ability of IJV partners to manage IJV challenges. 
Second, we explain our case study design, data collection procedures, and analysis. 
We then show our case analysis and discuss the findings. Finally, we illustrate the 
academic implications of the results, followed by limitations and future research 
directions. 
 
2. IJV management structure 
2.1 Definition and dimensions  
Management structure has been defined as the pattern of division of power between 
the IJV partners in governing the IJV (Killing, 1983; Yan, 1998). The literature 
highlights two primary features of management structure: equity ownership and 
management control (division of management responsibility). The level of equity 
contributed by each partner provides control and influence through legally defined 
authority and formal decision rights (Liu, Adair & Bello, 2015; Mjoen & Tallman, 
1997). Although the power of equity ownership to influence IJVs has been much 
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debated (Killing, 1983; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997), much scholarship agrees with the 
established theoretical argument of transaction cost economics that equity aligns the 
interests of partners, promotes future investments and reduces partner opportunism 
(Beamish, 1985; Hennart, 1988; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997). In cases of unequal equity 
share, partners with the larger equity can use majority voting rights to overrule other 
partners when disagreements occur (Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006).  
 Another important feature of an IJV structure is the management control 
arrangement. Yan and Gray (1994, p. 1994) define this as “the control exercised by 
the sponsoring organization in influencing a joint venture’s strategic and operational, 
decisions and regulating its important activities”. Control arrangement establishes the 
managerial division of labour and the amount of decision power each partner 
exercises over IJV strategy and operations. Although the management control 
arrangement is negotiated when the IJV is formed, it can change as the IJV progresses 
with some partners becoming more or less influential (Liu et al. 2015; Mjoen & 
Tallman, 1997; Yan & Gray, 1994;).   
 
2.2 Shared management structure 
The “50:50” or shared IJV structure is a common approach to organize IJVs. In a 
shared IJV, partners make an equal equity contribution, have equal contractual control 
rights and formal power. As IJV parents co-manage IJV operations, they tend to share 
resources extensively and engage in frequent interaction and mutual consultation 
(Hambrick et al. 2001; Killing, 1983; Pearce 1997; Salk, 1996).  
            Research on the impact of the shared structure on the IJV performance is 
largely inconclusive. Many view the shared structure as prone to instability and 
under-performance. Killing (1983), Ding (1997), Owens and Quinn (2007) and others 
7 
 
find that shared power and decision-making often causes serious conflicts as partners’ 
objectives usually cannot be perfectly aligned. Moreover, integrated operations and 
frequent shared decision-making may offer one partner opportunities to appropriate 
the other partner’s assets (Kogut, 1988; Park & Ugson, 1997). Other studies, however, 
suggested that shared IJV can facilitate better relationships and performance. For 
example, shared IJVs can improve knowledge transfer and decision-making through 
mutual partner involvement and familiarity (Hill & Hellrigel, 1994; Saxton, 1997). 
Equal management control may generate more mutual consideration between IJV 
parents, promoting trust and reducing conflict (Bleeke & Ernst, 1993; Beamish, 1993; 
Steensma & Lyles, 2000; Yan & Gray, 1994).  
              
3. IJV inter-partner relationship and managing IJV challenges   
IJV and alliance scholarship has long established the quality inter-partner relationship 
as a crucial factor for IJV success (Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006; Cullen et al. 2000; 
Das & Teng, 1998; Krishnan, Geysken, & Steenkamp, 2016; Mohr & Puck, 2013; Liu 
et al. 2010; Madhok, 1995; Robson, Skarmeas, & Spyropoulou, 2006). Strong 
relationships mean closer partner interaction, foster knowledge transfer and encourage 
the partners to adapt the IJV to evolving contingencies (Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006; 
Das & Teng, 1998; Kale & Singh, 2009; Madhok, 1995; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
Closer bonds between managers help them deal with conflicts and crisis situations 
more effectively (Robson et al., 2006; Schreiner, Kale, & Corsten, 2009).  
Conceptually, inter-partner relationships are often described using the 
dimensions or conditions of trust, commitment and communication and/or influencing 
(e.g., Cullen et al, 2000; Kim & Parkhe, 2009; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; 
Madhok, 1995; Mohr & Puck, 2005; Muthusamy & White, 2006). We now define and 
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outline the possible benefits of these three specific relational conditions for managing 
IJV challenges:     
Trust has been often considered a central issue in IJVs and other alliance 
forms (Boersma, Buckley, & Ghauri, 2003; Das & Teng, 1998; Krishnan et al. 2016; 
Mayer et al. 1995; Mohr and Puck, 2013; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). A 
common definition of trust is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or 
control that party” (Mayer et al. 1995, p.712). Trust has been considered valuable in 
IJVs because it can reduce transaction costs and help generates new ideas when 
partners pool their knowledge (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; Brouthers & Bamossy, 
2006). Trust can also influence the way partners perceive their disagreements (Ness, 
2009). It may diffuse conflict as trusting partners are more likely to interpret each 
other's actions in a positive manner or view conflict as functional, encouraging them 
to discuss problems openly (Madhok, 1995; Lin, 2004). Trust can increase 
information sharing between partners, aiding problem-solving negotiations (Ness, 
2009). Moreover, trusting partners are likely to have respect for another and 
empathise with each other’s point of view (Krishman et al., 2006).  
Commitment has been viewed as highly beneficial for trust building, decision-
making, and enhanced performance in IJVs (Chung & Beamish, 2010; Cullen et al. 
2000; Isidor, Schwens, Hornung, & Kabst, 2015; Kwon, 2008). Commitment reflects 
a desire for continuing the IJV relationship via maximum effort, and the willingness 
to invest resources into the relationship (Cullen et al. 2000; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; 
Sarkar, Aulakh & Cavusgil, 1998). As commitment represents an internalised 
obligation to ensure a business relationship endures, it can provide IJV partners with 
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the strong motivation to manage post-formation challenges (Brouthers & Bamossy, 
2006). Committed partners are more likely to balance short-term problems against 
long-term goals and resolve to work through issues (Cullen et al. 2000; Nakos & 
Brouthers, 2008).  
The literature identifies two forms of commitment. Calculative commitment 
reflects the rational and economic side of commitment (Cullen et al. 2000). 
Calculative commitment is driven via the anticipated profits of the IJV and the costs 
of leaving it (Voss, Johnson, Cullen, Sakano, & Takenouchi, 2006). It is based on 
factors such as cost/benefit analysis, potential for returns, past investments, and 
switching costs associated with an IJV (Cullen et al. 2000; Voss et al. 2006). Affective 
commitment, on the other hand, involves a sense of identification, loyalty and 
psychological attachment between IJV team members (Cullen et al. 2000). 
Finally, communication and influencing has been considered important for 
post-formation management of IJVs (Kim & Parkhe, 2009; Mohr & Puck, 2005). 
Communication is defined as “the formal and informal sharing of timely information 
between firms” (Anderson & Narus, 1990, p. 44). Quality communication may help 
address post-formation challenges. For instance, honest and open communication may 
allow partners to better understand the extent of their differences and get to know 
each other’s respective goals or practices (Kim & Parkhe, 2009; Mohr & Puck, 2005).  
On the other hand, partners may utilize communication to resolve challenges 
on their own terms. Managers may attempt to change the actions of others through 
influencing (Pearce, 1997). Muthusamy and White (2006, p. 59) defined mutual 
influence as "the relative degree to which partners influence each other's decisions 
about key issues in the specific alliance".  IJV managers attempt to influence partner’s 
opinion and build consensus through rational persuasion, consultation and personal 
10 
 
appeals. Influencing may facilitate conflict resolution and joint decision-making 
(Beamish, 1993; Muthusamy, White, & Carr, 2007). The ongoing exchange and co-
ordination between partners enhances relational ties and promotes mutual trust.  
It is clear that relationship conditions and strategies play a highly constructive 
role to manage post-formation IJV challenges (Barden et al. 2005; Brothers & 
Bamossy, 2006). Yet none of the studies examine in detail the link between particular 
IJV structures and specific relational conditions and how, in turn, these conditions 
contribute to the managers’ ability to address specific post-formation challenges.  
To sum up, the nature of the relational conditions can significantly impact IJV 
partners’ efforts to manage challenges. In the next section, we explore the linkage 
between the 50:50 structure, inter-partner relational conditions and opportunities for 
managing post-formation IJV challenges. 
 
4. Shared structure, inter-partner relationship and post-formation challenges 
Existing studies suggested a number of ways in which the shared IJV structure may 
facilitate better relational conditions within the IJV. Active sharing of management 
responsibility may encourage strong personal bonds between key managers, 
facilitating timely responses to problematic situations and enabling one way or mutual 
adaptation to overcome disputes (Schreiner et al. 2009). High level of investment 
(50% of capital costs for each partner) and perceived high exit costs can engender 
calculative commitment, which in turn, motivates partners to actively resolve 
disagreements (Sharma, Young, & Wilkinson, 2006). Balanced formal power and 
extensive resource interdependencies can sensitize partners against using hard or 
forceful measures to resolve challenges. Instead, they may adopt softer or informal 
measures such as communication-influencing strategies (Hambrick et al. 2001; 
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Pearce, 1997; Park & Russo, 1996; Salk & Brannen, 2000). Moreover, partners may 
find that the interactive and participative nature of shared decision-making 
encourages the development of managerial communication skills and politicking 
(Johnson, Cullen, Sakano, & Takenouchi, 1996). Such tactics may include rational 
communications, persuasion, consultation, personal appeals to pressure and 
legitimating tactics (Pearce, 1997). As Beamish (1988) argued, “shared management 
requires people who are willing to understand, learn and be persuaded, as well as 
being persuasive (p.65).  
To conclude, the shared management structure may yield relationship 
conditions that could positively contribute to managing post-formation challenges. 
The relationship between shared management structure, inter-partner relationship and 
managing IJV challenges will constitute the primary focus of our study. We now 
detail our methodological approach. 
 
5. Methodology 
We employed a case study methodology in this project. Previous research has proven 
the ability of case studies to yield rich data for investigating shared management IJVs 
(Salk, 1996; Salk & Brannan, 2000) and more generally, the IJV post-formation stage 
(Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006, Buchel, 2000, 2002; Hyder & Ghauri, 1989; Ness, 
2009).  We based our investigation on four cases of shared IJVs in order to increase 
the validity and reliability of our results by considering whether our findings would be 
replicated across different organisational situations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin 2003).  
Following Eisenhardt (1989), our desire for in-depth enquiry restricted the 
number of cases to four. We employed “purposive sampling” for case selection 
(Patton, 1990). We selected IJVs structured through shared management where each 
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IJV parent contributed 50% of the equity and equally shared control in the IJV. These 
structural characteristics were verified through telephone conversations with 
corporate managers and site visits. The site visits for one to three days in each case 
thereby allowing the researcher to develop good relationships with the interviewees. 
All shared IJVs were based in the British retail sector as there was vibrant IJV activity 
in this sector when this study was conducted, which increased our chances of gaining 
access to organisations. In addition, at the time of the study, British retailers were 
actively forming partnerships with companies from culturally and institutionally 
distant locations, mainly in Asia, which provided a fertile context for exploring the 
management of post-formation challenges that can be heightened in contexts 
involving great institutional diversity. Our selected IJVs involved British 
multinational retailers with partners based in Taiwan (x 2), Turkey (x 1) and Japan (x 
1). Table 1 provides an overview of the case companies. 
 
Table 1: Overview of Case Companies 
Case Retail sector Host market 
of IJV entry 
Year shared 
IJV established 
Partner type Ownership (at 
formation) 
A Home 
Improvement 
Taiwan 1994 Exporter/importer, 
real estate 
50:50 
50:50 
B Home 
Improvement 
Turkey 2000 Diversified 
manufacturing 
and services. 
 
50:50 
C Furniture Taiwan 2001 Retailer 50:50 
D Music Japan 1991 Retailer 50:50 
 
We collected the data in 2004. We interviewed 26 British senior managers directly 
involved in shared IJVs. Access to partner managers was not possible as they were 
based at geographically distant locations. Interviews were conducted in person, on the 
British parent company premises, averaged around one hour and twenty minutes in 
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duration and were recorded with respondent’s permission and transcribed within five 
days. Table 2 provides details of interviews. 
Table 2: Interview Details 
Case Personnel interviewed Location of 
Interviews 
Case documents 
reviewed 
A General Manager 
Director of International 
Development (2) International 
Trading Director, International 
Strategy Director 
Director of International 
Property Director of 
Human Resources 
International Marketing 
Manager 
Head Office (UK) Corporate annual 
report 
Newspaper 
clippings on JV, and 
market context. 
 
 
B General Manager 
International Property manager 
Director of Human Resources 
International Marketing 
Manager International 
Development manager 
International Trading Director, 
International Strategy Director 
Head Office (UK) Corporate annual 
report 
Newspaper 
clippings on JV, and 
market context 
JV Property team 
briefing report. 
 
C Director of International 
Operations Director of 
International Marketing 
Director or Business 
Development (2) International 
Marketing Manager Director of 
Finance 
General Manager 
Head Office (UK) Corporate annual 
reports 
JV business plan 
Newspaper 
clippings on JV, and 
market context. 
 
D General Manager 
Chief Executive Officer 
Director of Marketing 
Director of Finance 
Head Office (UK) N/A 
 
We interviewed multiple informants within each shared IJV to minimize recall 
bias and yield rich data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2013). The focus was on the 
individuals directly involved in and therefore possessing knowledge about the 
14 
 
establishment and management of the IJVs. The interviews were loosely structured to 
give our respondents the freedom to discuss subjects that they considered pertinent. 
The structure was provided by the general framework derived from the literature: we 
encouraged the interview respondents to reflect on specific areas of their IJV 
experience such as the meaning and nature of the shared management structure in 
their IJVs, the challenges they experienced in post-formation IJV management, 
whether and how they addressed these challenges, and what helped them address 
them. In this way, we ensured that the interviews contained information relevant to 
our research objectives but that the interview respondents were not overly constrained 
in their responses by the researchers’ perspectives. The resulting verbatim interview 
transcripts were about 20 single-spaced pages in length each and contained rich 
narratives of IJV experiences.  
Although most of the IJVs were no more than three years old when our data 
was collected, we specifically used the recall method to elicit respondents’ 
experiences of IJV management. Recall method is typically used to tap into 
individuals’ memories where information specific to one's personal history or 
experiences is stored (Bagozzi & Silk, 1983; Bradburn, 2004, Gardial, Clemons, 
Woodruff, & Schumann, 1994; Tulving, 1983). To minimize recall bias, we asked 
respondents to focus on their most recent, and therefore best memorized experiences 
of the shared IJV. We provided stimulus cues that were highly relevant in an IJV 
management context – asking managers about their experiences of IJV 
conflict/disagreements, social bonds, communication and persuasion – to facilitate 
good recall (Sudman & Bradburn, 1973).  
The interview transcripts were sent back to the interview participants for 
checking to maintain the data reliability and validity (Eisenhardt, 1989). Finally, to 
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further enrich and corroborate the interview data, secondary data was used (Loane, 
Bell, & McNaughton, 2006; Piekkari & Welch, 2011), for example, annual reports, 
newspaper clippings, and internal briefing reports, where permission was granted.  
Data was analyzed through thematic content analysis. Several stages of coding 
were used (Miles & Huberman, 1984). We used manual coding (without the 
assistance from qualitative data coding software) in order the preserve the narrative 
integrity of the transcripts and make sure that we always interpreted the coded 
sections of the text within the context of the rest of the conversation. First, we 
identified and highlighted interview passages that referred to various aspects of the 
key themes in our research questions – the nature of the shared management set up 
within the case IJVs, post-formation problems experienced by the interview 
respondents, post-formation relational conditions, and managerial responses to post-
formation challenges. This level of coding involved themes found in the literature 
(e.g. task-related conflicts) and also themes that emerged from the data (e.g. 
management errors).  
The second stage of analysis involved reducing the number of codes through 
comparing the text in each code and merging closely related codes. This process also 
involved comparing the coding structures of different interviews within and between 
cases. This helped organise the data and make key themes more visible by 
establishing clearer coding system that was consistent over the whole data set. 
Finally, we explored the relationships between the different categories of codes to 
each other – e.g. whether post-formation challenges were discussed in relation to 
features of the IJV structure, whether managers used particular approaches to address 
post-formation challenges, and whether, in turn, these approaches themselves were 
associated with aspects of IJV structure. This allowed us to trace the relationships 
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between the three key areas of our research – the shared IJV structure, the relational 
conditions created by it, and managers’ attempts to resolve post-formation challenges.  
The important limitation of our methodology is the fact that it was not possible 
for us to examine the non-British partners’ perspectives. The non-British IJV partners 
may have offered a different view of the relational outcomes, post-formation 
challenges and how they were managed. To compensate for this limitation and to 
improve data validity and reliability we relied on triangulation (Eisenhardt, 1989). We 
have triangulated the data in two ways: the use of multiple cases, and multiples 
informants within each case. First, we used four cases which allowed for comparative 
analysis between the cases, as well as a deeper and richer look at each case. Second, 
we interviewed multiple informants within the British partner companies to reduced 
selective memory bias. As a result, we found a strong degree of agreement in the 
accounts of our multiple informants. 
 
6. Findings 
The findings section is structured as follows: First, we outline the major features of 
the shared structure of the case IJVs to provide the background information on the 
cases. Second, we summarize the challenges that our interviewees experienced during 
the post-formation stage. Finally, we present the analysis that demonstrates how the 
shared IJV structure allowed particular relational conditions to arise between the IJV 
partners that, in turn, helped them address the post-formation challenges.  
 
6.1 Shared management structure 
All IJVs in our sample included two partners, each contributing 50% equity into the 
venture. The IJV agreement in each case involved partners having equal decision-
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making authority and responsibility for strategy and operations. In case A, for 
example, partners agreed to share strategic control, with the joint IJV board taking 
decisions in each quarter. The partners jointly formulated major policies and engaged 
in joint decision-making in store operations, marketing, finance and HR. Case B 
partners had equal representation on the IJV board, meeting quarterly to discuss 
strategy and policy, and engaged in joint decision-making over operations, sourcing, 
marketing and personnel.  
At the same time, our cases showed that shared IJV structures are more 
complex than a simple equality of decision-making power based on equal equity and 
contractual control arrangements. Equal equity contribution did not always mean 
equal power. The partners sometimes used other management tools to gain influence. 
In some cases, the attempts to gain influence beyond the 50% vote resulted in 
problems. In other cases, subtler strategies were used that allowed the companies to 
increase their influence while maintaining good relations with their partners. In cases 
A, B and C, British partners used expatriate managers to supplement their control. In 
Case A, the British company sent seven British expatriates into the IJV during the 
initial period to work with two partner managers and the partner’s chairman. These 
British expatriates had significant influence on operations but not without problems. 
They tended to promote their own corporate philosophy for the IJV and were reluctant 
to involve the partner in operational decision-making. This resulted in conflicts with 
the local partner. In Case C, however, the British seconded three British expatriates to 
the venture and the local partner contributed three managers. This more balanced 
team worked well together. Through prior experience of franchising in Asia, the 
British partner in Case C recognized the need to develop good relations with their 
local partner and to practice shared control.  
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British partners also used their operational business knowledge to gain more 
influence in the relationship. In Cases A, B and C, the British partner had somewhat 
greater influence over operations. In Case C, for example, the IJV was based on the 
British business model and the British partner had superior retailing expertise, 
allowing them stronger influence in store operations. However, both partners were 
committed to consensus-based decision-making and managed to maintain excellent 
relations: 
“This joint venture is very much operationally led by us, however we makes 
decisions together as it is a 50:50. The partner is learning about the 
business.” (Case C/General Manager) 
 
 “I think if is to be a joint venture, I believe it has got to be a 50:50 and you 
have got to work out your differences on that basis. We never saw the need to 
have control.  We saw the need to have influence, but we didn’t see that being 
through equity, we saw that through the relationship.” (Case C/Finance 
Director) 
 
6.2. Post-formation challenges  
Our analysis identified the following categories of post-formation challenges: 
operational task-related conflicts generated by inter-firm diversity that sometimes also 
led to relational conflicts, disagreements over IJV strategy, and resourcing issues and 
management errors. We discuss each category in turn below.  
 
6.2.1 Task conflict caused by inter-firm diversity 
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The most common challenge in our cases involved task conflict or disagreements on 
operational policy. A major source of inter-organizational differences were the 
diverse institutional and organizational backgrounds of the British and Asian partners.  
For example, British companies in Cases A and C partnered with family Asian 
companies. Organizational governance differences between the British MNEs and 
Asian family firms created conflicting viewpoints in strategic and operational 
planning.  In Case A, for example, divergent styles of decision-making generated 
disagreements in planning, store operations and media engagement.  Moreover, 
relational type conflict resulted when frustrated British expatriates ignored the partner 
in operational decisions: 
“We started to have a lack of understanding and communication with the 
partner as to their need for involvement in operations, that is, we were 
ignoring them” (Case A/International Trading Manager).  
  
The behaviour of the British partner in Case A angered the local partner who 
then punitively removed British IJV staff work permits, which escalated the crisis and 
raised discussions about IJV termination. In contrast to Case A, the British and Asian 
partners in Case B enjoyed good co-operation, capitalizing on similar corporate 
values, formal structures and internal governance procedures. However, despite these 
similarities, several operational differences resulted in task conflict. The first conflict 
concerned sourcing: extensive diversification allowed each partner to advance 
themselves as a likely supplier of operational resource inputs. Second, partners 
disagreed on the financial procedures for funding new stores:   
“The main reason why this 50:50 has been difficult is that because the 
partners can’t agree on funding. … The issue was that the partner prefers 
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finance, and we prefer equity. Until you can reach agreement on the financing 
of the business, it will be very difficult to move anywhere. So for two years 
during the crisis we have stood still.” (Case B/International Business 
Development Director) 
Case C also experienced task-related disagreements. In contrast to the British 
managerial style, management by objectives was not the norm for the Taiwanese, 
neither was the formalized strategic planning. The Taiwanese partner rarely used 
quantitative metrics in strategic planning, nor was strongly devoted to the logic of 
profit maximization. At store level, the British expected the Taiwanese staff to 
identify process errors or products that required adaption to the local market. 
However, Taiwanese staff did not feel comfortable pointing out shortcomings of 
higher-ranking British managers. At a broader level, the Taiwanese partner in Case C 
resisted the British operating model. This generated disagreements between the 
partners, resulting in slower decision-making.  
 
6.2.2 Strategy-related conflict 
Much of the strategy-related conflict was linked with environmental volatility. In 
Case B, the 2000/2001 economic crisis in Turkey resulted in a sharp depreciation of 
the Turkish Lira and a contraction of GDP by 5.7%. Decreased sales and store 
performance altered the partners’ strategic priorities for the IJV. The Turkish partner 
adopted a short-term and risk averse position, arguing to postpone expansion until 
trading conditions improved. The British, however, preferred to proceed with the 
initial strategic plan to gain competitive and scale advantages 
Underlying this strategic conflict was a difference in the centrality of the IJV 
in each parent organization’s broader strategy. The IJV held less importance for the 
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highly diversified and conglomerate Turkish partner than for the British multinational 
whose whole business model was focused on retailing.   
          Similar to Case B, the partners in Case D experienced incompatible strategic 
goals. Strategic differences generated disagreements over strategic plans and fostered 
internal competition for management control. British ability to maintain a strong 
bargaining position declined as dependency on partner resources increased. The 
company’s subsequent entry into the US absorbed group resources, reducing capital 
and managerial support to the venture. Consequently, increasing dependency on the 
local partner securing debt finance and managerial resources forced the British to 
accept greater partner influence on strategy.   
 
6.2.3 Resource issues and management errors 
Resource issues and management errors created further challenges. In Case D, 
insufficient managerial and financial resources for the Japanese shared IJV created 
problems. In Cases A and B, when the British partners initiated the IJV, they gave 
limited consideration to how divergent partner characteristics would impact the 
operations. Moreover, the British partners’ expatriates did not initially have the 
expertise to adjust to organizational differences. In case A, for example, the British 
partner staffed the shared IJV with inexperienced senior expatriate managers whose 
lack of regard for the partner and shared control led to misunderstandings and 
undermined co-operation:  
“In terms of our staffing, the expatriates in the early days of the business were 
not the right personalities from our side. We didn’t look at personality and 
attitude to work in an Asian context that we do today” (Case A/International 
Marketing Director). 
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In a similar way, in Case C, insufficient British organizational resourcing 
exasperated the challenges of sharing management control with a partner without 
retailing expertise. The internal training provision to upgrade partner knowledge and 
skills was grossly inadequate. This forced the British to totally rely on experiential 
and operational learning to upgrade the partner’s knowledge and skill. Yet this was 
ineffectual because not all the British team had good product and sector expertise. 
Finally, in Case B, the contract failed to specify those policy issues which partners 
disagreed on.  
 
6.3 Managing post-formation challenges in shared IJVs 
In each part of this section, we first outline our broad conclusions about the 
relationship between shared structure, relational conditions and the opportunities 
available for managers to cope with post-formation challenges, and then provide 
detailed examples of how the relationships between these factors unfolded in 
individual case IJVs. All positive outcomes of shared management structure were not 
observed in all cases.  
 
6.3.1 Mutual trust and respect 
As discussed above, shared management led to conflicts in some of our cases. At the 
same time, the requirement for close cooperation and shared the decision-making in a 
shared structure forced the partner companies in situations of prolonged exposure to 
each other, allowing them to learn about each other’s strategic priorities and 
operations. This greater insider knowledge decreased uncertainty in interaction and 
allowed mutual trust and respect to develop.         
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Cases B, C and D showed how joint IJV management provided partners with 
motivation and opportunity to develop trust. Contractual shared responsibility and 
shared contributions formally required the partners to work closely together to 
manage multiple functional areas of the venture. This meant intensive co-operation, 
interaction and information transfers. For example, in Case B, while partners 
experienced task-related conflicts, they also had to learn about each other in order to 
share control. We observed a similar situation in Case D:   
“There an extraordinary level of learning that goes to make shared 
management a reality; … in terms of learning and trusting each other and 
knowing what makes the other person tick.”(Director of Finance/Case D) 
 
“As we were sharing control over [the IJV], we had to work very close 
together on a range of areas pretty much every day, including the senior 
people.  We made decisions together, shared all the information necessary 
about the market, about company performance, about our views, so that has 
helped to establish trust in each other”. (General Manager/Case C) 
  
The growth of trust and respect between the partners helped manage post-
formation challenges. In Case C, the formal mandate of shared operational control 
required IJV managers to work closely with each other in the same office. This 
physical proximity and the shared responsibility, supported by inter-personal 
similarity (gender and age) and good initial performance facilitated trust and respect 
within the team. When disagreements appeared, the already established trust and 
respect between the partners smoothed the tension and supported constructive open 
discussions and consensus building: 
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“When we have had those operational problems, we have been able to sit 
round the table and sort it out.  So that’s what I mean about relationship.  It’s 
not all been smooth, we have had some times to look at each other in the eye 
and say this is not working out.  The best part of having that sort of 
relationship is honesty and trust.” (Case C/General Manager) 
   
6.3.2 Commitment 
Shared management also provided opportunities for the growth of commitment in 
inter-partner relationships. The fact that both partners provided large portions of 
equity and had high exit costs increased their calculative commitment and motivated 
them to make the relationship work. Partners put effort into resolving conflicts to 
recover their investment. Prolonged and intense interaction between the partners in 
some cases also resulted in strong affective commitment. 
Calculative commitment was a major factor motivating the British partner in 
Case A to resolve conflicts. The 50% capital contribution, the significant ongoing 
financial returns and the exit cost encouraged the British partner to continue with the 
venture following the relationship crisis in 1997:  
“So even if the marriage is bad, both sides do not want to lose the children.  
We do not want to sell it and the partners don’t want to sell it. [Chairman of 
partner] knows how much it is worth to us … when we say “we’ll give you 
£7m for it”, he’ll “ it’s worth £14m!!”  And so it is that kind of argument that 
he knows what its worth and we know what it’s worth and therefore we will be 
married forever.” (International Trading Manager/Case A)    
The calculative commitment of the British partner in Case A motivated them 
to reflect on the operational and relationship context which led them to recognize their 
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own role in the conflict, including their inappropriate organizational expectations, 
planning and managerial resourcing. As a result, the British changed their 
management team, removing two British expatriates and transferring a highly skilled 
senior manager to direct operations and work with the partner’s chairman. This new 
manager signaled renewed commitment to the Taiwanese partner and adopted a more 
conciliatory decision-making style:  
“What shared control means is that technically you both bring the best of your 
businesses to the table but you also bring the worst of both businesses as well.  
And if you can’t agree, where do you go?  So I have sought to persuade my 
team that both sides should be prepared to be flexible, concede and look for 
win-win at all times. Even if you can’t find win-win - be prepared to accept 
lose-win.” (Case A/International Business Development Director) 
 
This situation was ongoing for Case A. Even the transfer of the new 
experienced British manager improved co-operation, later operational changes created 
further disagreements, compromising trust and leading the partners to revisit the 
buyout option. Again, however, high termination costs prevented termination. 
In Cases B, C and D, the shared structure was associated with both calculative 
and affective commitment.  In Case B, the British partner perceived the IJV as being 
more important for themselves than for their Turkish partner as it was firmly 
connected to the core of the British parent retailing business but formed only a 
peripheral part of the diversified Turkish partner’s business. Despite this asymmetry, 
the initial investment of £12.5m and optimistic future returns prognoses meant the 
British partner felt a high level of calculative commitment. In addition, the complex 
contractual arrangement of the 50:50 venture took a long time – two years – to 
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negotiate. This prolonged negotiating period allowed the partners the time to establish 
a close relationship and affective commitment.  
The affective commitment between partners in Case B facilitated open 
discussions and smoothed the tensions resulting from disagreement over strategy. The 
British compromised, agreeing to hold expansion and concentrate on existing stores. 
The compromise, however, did not immediately lead to tangible positive results. The 
British witnessed a retraction of the Turkish partner effort within IJV property 
operations while they continued to acquire sites for their domestic business. As 
partner opportunism became apparent, the British realized their concern for the 
preservation of a harmonious relationship led them to act too passively:  
“Our thinking at that point was that 50:50 is a very delicate balance.  You 
fall out in a 50:50 and you are in big trouble, … so you end up being very, 
very polite and that again can waste a hell a lot of time and the big thing 
for us is property and we should have been stronger.” (Case 
B/International Director) 
This experience led the British to negotiate a small joint-project team to find 
store sites, which improved cooperation with the Turkish partner. Ultimately, 
however, what encouraged the British partner to work through the difficulties was 
their committed relationship with the Turkish partner:  
“I mean Turkey has survived everything that can happen to a joint venture: 
interest rates going from 80% to 2000%, paying too much for a site, having 
the wrong expat management team and the collapse of the Turkish lira.  … But 
the people dealing with the business are the people who have always dealt 
with the business. What glues it together is the personal involvement and the 
commitment of the people.” (Director of International Trading) 
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In Case D, we found affective commitment between managers operating the 
shared IJV.  The British and Japanese general managers jointly managed operations 
and worked close together. The managers equal management input and responsibility 
and their commitment to their fostered trust and respect, which gradually morphed 
into loyalty and attachment between the two. As the General Manager explained:     
“There was strong respect between us and if he really thought strongly about 
something and I would support him 100% even if parent management maybe 
didn’t agree and if I thought strongly about something, he would support me 
as well. It was like an unwritten rule if you like” (Case D/General Manager) 
 
The British manager further indicated that this commitment enabled them 
some influence over their respective parent companies. This was especially useful to 
smooth the tensions on the strategic disagreements. However, the growing 
asymmetrical levels of calculative commitment and investment into the venture (as 
noted earlier) allowed the Japanese more bargaining power over the disagreement 
through provision of capital and managerial resources into the venture.  
           
6.3.3 Managerial influencing  
In our 50:50 cases, it was not possible for either partner to have unilateral control and 
use the higher equity to force particular decisions on the venture. Instead, they had to 
adopt a more subtle, participatory and conciliatory approach to influence their partner 
and also be prepared to be influenced themselves. We observed the use of managerial 
influencing or rational persuasion, consultation and personal appeals in our cases. 
These subtler approaches allowed the partners to maintain more cordial relationships 
and facilitated resolution of disagreements.  
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In Case C, for example, British managers openly admitted the impossibility of 
applying formal means to achieve favorable positions: 
“We saw the need to have influence, but we didn’t see that being through 
equity, we saw that through the relationship…Equity control is not going to 
make a difference.” (Finance Director/Case C) 
Instead, they adopted careful influencing to persuade their partner of divergent sector 
origins to accept specific aspects of the operating model: 
“We have spent the first two years influencing, persuading, cajoling the 
partner. The good news is we have a good relationship.  We talk about 
everything. No they don’t always like our decisions and yes they will say they 
don’t like them but because we respect each other we will sit down and talk 
and it takes weeks sometime.” (Case C/General Manager) 
 
“We don’t have big arguments, we work things through. So from day one it is 
all about compromise, talking about things, listening.” (Case C/International 
Marketing Manager) 
The influencing strategy required commitment and investments, the 
introduction of new staff, socialization, and increased parent level management visits. 
First, members of the British team were replaced with more experienced managers. 
Second, both partners replaced several store-level employees and sales managers with 
staff new to the industry. This aimed to socialize new employees into the company’s 
vision. Third, the British increased parent-level senior management visits which 
facilitated communication and further relationship development.  
          The British company in Case D learned to influence their partner while also 
being receptive to partner influence. As they realized that attempting to impose their 
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own way all the time in a 50:50 structure would cause tensions, they sometimes 
acquiesced to avoid confrontation and legal disputes and to protect the relationship. 
This openness of the British to being influenced was also indicative of the loyalty and 
attachment prevailing between them and the Japanese managers: 
“In the midst of disagreement, we realised that having a 50:50 partnership in 
Japan, we had to listen to what opinions came forward from that and 
sometimes we imposed our way and sometimes we gave in because there is no 
point in getting into a legal battle because once you to do you may as well 
close the joint venture and I believe that completely. It has got to be a friendly 
partnership” (Case D/Senior Manager)   
 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
7.1 Discussion  
Our findings linked the shared management IJV structure to the development of post-
formation relational conditions which, in turn, help the IJV partners address post-
formation challenges. This link between shared management, relational conditions 
and managing post-formation challenges contains a paradox: while increasing the 
likelihood of post-formation conflicts, the shared structure simultaneously offers 
scope for cohesive relationship development.  
As identified by IJV scholars (Hambrick et al. 2001; Pearce, 1997), shared 
management is highly integrative in orientation and involves high task and resource 
interdependence between partners. This can lead to sustained close inter-partner 
interaction, extensive information sharing, close co-operation, learning about each 
other and developing cohesive relationships. Our data suggests this only occurs when 
partners comply with the mandate of shared management. In this respect, our case 
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companies shared control and co-managed their IJVs with their partner, and 
developed close relationships, except case A. These companies developed positive 
relational conditions – trust and respect, commitment and influencing – that helped 
manage post-formation IJV challenges.  
The findings show how shared management contributes to the development of 
trust and respect between partners. We also found that trust and respect helped diffuse 
conflicts and promoted the ability of partners to understand each other’s position and 
point of view.  
In addition to providing opportunities for trust development, shared 
management encouraged commitment in the inter-partner relationships. Building on 
IJV commitment research (Cullen et al. 2000; Isidor et al. 2015; Kwon, 2008; Voss et 
al. 2006), our study suggests shared management can increase affective and 
calculative commitment in the IJV and that both types of commitment play a positive 
role in addressing post-formation challenges. Some case partners were motivated to 
resolve post-formation issues and correct their own mistakes (e.g. resourcing errors) 
as a result of the instrumental worth of continuing the relationship. The fact that both 
partners provided large portions of equity and would suffer high exit costs provided 
them with the motivation to resolve conflicts. Furthermore, prolonged and intense 
interaction between the partners in some cases also resulted in affective commitment. 
          Equal formal authority, the lack of formal dominance by one partner and the 
inappropriateness of forceful tactics provides partners with and incentive to employ 
intensive communication and influencing to resolve disagreements. Supporting the 
studies of Pearce, (1997), Muthusamy and White, (2006), and Muthusamy et al. 
(2007), IJV managers in our cases exercised persuasive communication to align 
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partner opinion to their own preferences even thought this influencing could be time 
consuming.  
Our study makes three key contributions. First, our study contributes to the 
research on shared management IJVs. Decades of IJV control research predominately 
examined the relationship between IJV management structure and performance, 
largely comparing shared versus dominant structures (e.g., Beamish, 1984; Ding, 
1997; Killing, 1983; Lane & Beamish, 1990; Mjoen & Tallman, 1997; Yan & Gray, 
1994). The performance agenda diverted attention away from understanding the 
evolution and management of shared IJVs. However, in this study, we focused on the 
post-formation management of shared IJVs, specifically on the relationship between 
shared structure, relational conditions and management of post-formation challenges. 
Our key finding is that the shared or 50:50 management IJV structure does not always 
generate paralyzing inter-partner conflicts, as many existing IJV studies contend (e.g., 
Ding, 1997; Killing, 1983) or lead to changed ownership and termination (Brouthers 
& Bamossy, 2006), but also can result in particular relational conditions that help 
partners resolve their conflicts and manage their differences. In this way, our study 
supports those studies that have promoted a more nuanced and complex 
understanding of the post-formation effects of IJV control structures (Barden et al. 
2005; Child & Yan, 2003; Steemsa et al. 2001).  
Second, we add to prior research on shared IJVs which have identified, to a 
degree, some positive co-operative and relational effects of shared IJV structures 
(Beamish, 1984; Child, 2000; Hebert, 1996; Steensma & Lyles, 2000). Unlike these 
studies, we have provided more in-depth insights into the interplay between shared 
structures and relational outcomes. Our findings suggest the central structural 
dimensions of equal ownership and shared management control positively influence 
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the development of trust, commitment and intense communication, which in turn, 
perform a highly constructive role for managing post-formation challenges. Our 
findings suggest the highly integrative nature of shared IJVs, including high 
operational interdependence and shared decision-making, encourages partners to work 
closely together, communicate frequently and intensely and exchange personnel. 
Although share management can lead to inter-partner conflicts, the equal investment 
and mutual responsibility provides partners with the motivation and opportunities to 
learn about each other, to learn how to better implement the control structure, to build 
trust, and to commit to the venture and partner. Our findings provide new insights into 
how the relational conditions of shared IJVs facilitate the management of IJVs.  
Finally, we provide empirical support to the conceptual arguments that the 
initial IJV design shapes how IJV partners behave during post-formation stage 
(Contractor, 2005; Contractor & Reuer, 2014; Hennart & Zeng, 2005). As a result, 
this study provides an initial response to Contractor (2005) and Hennart and Zeng 
(2005) who have called for more research linking structure to post-formation partner 
behaviors.   
 
7.2 Limitations and future research   
The study contains a number of limitations. Considering the qualitative nature of this 
research, generalisations must be done with care. The research is based on a small 
sample of UK retail multinationals with Asian partners, potentially limiting the 
implications to a particular sector and national context. Future studies may adopt 
larger and varied sample sizes to enhance external validity and expand 
generalisability. Second, we relied on data from one IJV parent only due to access 
constraints. As each IJV partner can interpret management experiences and events 
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differently, not interviewing the partners of the British companies may have resulted 
in omission of different points of view. However, we found strong agreement in the 
accounts of the multiple informants we did interview within each case study. Third, in 
our definition of formal structure we relied on the established decision-making power 
perspective (Killing, 1983), which largely restricted our appreciation of formal 
structure to two structural elements: equity share and agreed division of managerial 
responsibility. However, we appreciate how IJV control encompasses a wider set of 
formal and informal elements or mechanisms. Nevertheless, our findings should serve 
as a springboard for future research to examine how other management structures 
shape post-formation managerial actions.  
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